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Vol. V

AI and Agentic Systems Security for DevSecOps

LLM threats, agent authorisation, prompt-injection defence and the OWASP LLM Top 10

Vol. V

§ 01, De quoi il s'agit

How to put LLM-based and agentic systems inside a DevSecOps pipeline: threat landscape, prompt-injection defence, agent authorisation on least privilege, trust between agents, and the forensics and compliance questions regulators are starting to ask.

§ 02, Ce que je veux que le lecteur sache faire

  1. 01

    Threat-model an agent in a pipeline and say where injection, exfiltration and escalation would come from.

  2. 02

    Give an agent the least authority its task needs and keep a human in the loop where it matters.

  3. 03

    Reconstruct what an agent did from its session record.

§ 03, Le schéma auquel je reviens toujours

Défile sur le côté →

AI and agentic systems securityUserpromptInjection defencesanitise · classifyLLM agentplan → act → observetrust boundaryPOLA boundary: principle of least authoritycapability scope enforced herefile readshell execAPI callmemoryAudit logeach tool call recorded, signedOutput guardrailsPII redaction · content policyOWASP LLM Top 10 · model card: provider trust, fine-tuning supply chain
Figure, Volume V: a prompt through injection defence to an agent whose tools sit inside a least-authority boundary, with an audit log and output guardrails.

§ 04, Structure prévue

  1. Partie I

    The AI threat landscape

    The OWASP LLM Top 10 read against a delivery pipeline, and what the EU AI Act asks of high-risk systems.

  2. Partie II

    Prompt injection defence

    Direct and indirect injection, input and output validation, sandboxed tool execution, and how to test an agent against them.

  3. Partie III

    Agent authorisation and POLA

    Least authority for agents: scoped tools, short-lived credentials, human approval where it counts, and a contained blast radius.

  4. Partie IV

    Multi-agent trust chains

    Identity and attestation between agents, and the scenarios where one agent is used to manipulate another.

  5. Partie V

    AI forensics and compliance

    Session records for agents, evidence for an AI incident, and the traceability the EU AI Act expects.

§ 05, Quand ce sera lisible

Ce volume est en cours d’écriture. Laissez votre e-mail et je vous enverrai un seul message quand il sera lisible.

Un seul e-mail quand ce sera lisible.